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This paper aimed to explore, from the perspective of cognitive psychology, the natural limitations of
human cognition that determine our capabilities to deal with information overﬂow. These limitations are
related mainly to the working memory system. This system is conceived to be composed of the storage
components, which are responsible for active maintenance, and executive control that supervises the
storage units. People differ in their working memory capacities, and because virtually every complex
cognitive activity requires the temporal availability of a certain amount of cognitive representations,
these differences are predictive of many outcomes. In the area of ‘cold’ cognition, these outcomes include
intelligence and verbal reasoning, multitasking, language comprehension and verbal ﬂuency, whereas in
the area of ‘hot’ cognition, they include mentalising, stereotyping and self-control. Natural limitations in
working memory capacity may be overcome (to some extent) through the training of working memory
skills or the application of processing strategies (e.g. task simpliﬁcation, using external environment as in
situated or distributed cognition, changing a code of mental representation).
© 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In recent years, the concept of ‘overﬂow’ has occupied re-
searchers in many ﬁelds: from economics to management,
consulting and consumer studies, politics, education and so forth
(Czarniawska & L€ofgren,, 2012). However, when one speciﬁcally
refers to overﬂow of information, the topic seems particularly
relevant to cognitive psychology. Information overﬂow is deﬁned
as a situation in which ‘an individual's efﬁciency in using infor-
mation in their work is hampered by the amount of relevant, and
potentially useful, information available to them’ (Bawden &
Robinson, 2008, p. 3). This concept is closely related to cognitive
load, i.e. the state caused by excessive information supply and de-
mand, continuous multitasking and interruptions, and inadequate
workplace infrastructure (Kirsh, 2000). Among other con-
ceptualisations, information overﬂow has been conceived specif-
ically in relation to working memory (WM), a cognitive system that
is responsible for maintaining access to goal-relevant information
in support of ongoing cognitive tasks or behaviour (Baddeley, 1983,
2007). Accordingly, information overﬂow takes place when theIngardena 6, 30-060, Krakow,
. Gruszka).amount of information exceeds the capacity of an individual's WM
(Fournier, 1996). This constraint is seen as the primary impediment
to knowledge construction (Sweller, 1994) and as a potential cause
of everyday failures (Klingberg, 2009).
As Kirsh (2000) noted, studies on information overload were
focused on its consequences (see: Bawden & Robinson, 2008), such
as information anxiety, i.e. a state of uneasiness caused by the
inability to access or process necessary information (Wurman,
1990), or information withdrawal, i.e. a state of avoidance of su-
perﬂuous sources of information (Savolainen, 2007). It seems that
not enough attention has been paid to the sources of this phe-
nomenon. From the perspective of cognitive psychology, overﬂow
may result from structural limitations of basic mental mechanisms
that allow exertion and maintenance of control over informational
demands.
This paper aimed to show that humans are structurally limited
in their cognitive capacities and, consequently, that they are limited
in their ability to deal with information overﬂow. We provide evi-
dence that human cognitive limitations are rooted in the structure
and functions of WM, which allows short-term storage and
manipulation of task-relevant data. WM is severely limited in its
capacity to deal with complex tasks and situations. Moreover, this
capacity is not equally distributed among individuals and among
task situations. In other words, WM capacity can be conceptualised
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that these inter- and intra-individual differences can account for a
variety of phenomena, including the human (in)ability to deal with
information overﬂow in the social context. First, we describe the
concept of WM. Next, we address the issue of WM capacity. Finally,
we discuss the signiﬁcance ofWM capacity for understanding some
important psychological and social phenomena implicated with
information overﬂow.
2. The concept of working memory
In a way, the human cognitive system has evolved as a mean to
deal with information overﬂow. For example, humans see only a
small fraction of electromagnetic spectrum and hear only a tiny
portion of acoustic waves. Our momentary awareness of informa-
tional content is also very limited. These limitations are funda-
mental properties of the human mind and brain. The central issue
in cognitive psychology amounts to the exploration of such
limitations.
The early conceptualisations of the limits of human cognition
were related to the concept of short-term memory (STM), a system
responsible for moment-to-moment retention of information
(Broadbent, 1958). Peterson and Peterson (1959) were among the
ﬁrst psychologists to investigate the time constraints of STM. In
their experiment, participants were asked to remember and recall
(with a delay of 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 or 18 s) meaningless three-consonant
syllables (trigrams), while counting backwards to prevent
rehearsal. Very fast decay of information occurred because partic-
ipants could recall 80% of trigrams correctly after 3 s of delay, as
compared to less than 10% of trigrams after 18 s (Peterson &
Peterson, 1959). At the same time, George Miller (1956) summar-
ised evidence that people can repeat back only about seven
randomly ordered, meaningful items or chunks of information (i.e.
letters, digits or words). This early research suggested that STM is
very limited in both duration and capacity.
Nowadays, the concept of STM has been replaced by the notion
of WM, ﬁrst introduced byMiller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960) and
then developed by Baddeley and Hitch (1974). WM is supposed to
be an active, multicomponent system of information storage and
processing. Initially, the model involved the supervisory ‘central
executive’ system and two unimodal storage systems: the phono-
logical loop and the visuospatial sketchpad (Baddeley & Hitch,
1974). The central executive system was envisioned as a control
structure of limited attentional capacity, responsible for manipu-
lating information in the WM and controlling the two subordinate
subsystems. In contrast, both short-term storages, as domain spe-
ciﬁc, were responsible for maintaining verbal or visuospatial in-
formation, respectively. Several years later, Baddeley (2000)
supplemented his model with the episodic bufferda limited ca-
pacity multimodal store responsible for integrating information in
various codes and, with regard to time axis, into unitary episodic
representations. The three storage subsystems are controlled by the
central executive system, which is additionally responsible for
integrating information from various sources into coherent epi-
sodes. Importantly, all the systems proposed by Baddeley were of
limited capacity, although in different ways. The central executive
was conceived as a limited capacity pool of general processing re-
sources, while the phonological loop, the visuospatial sketchpad
and the episodic buffer were subjected to both time and span
constraints.
In the model proposed by Nelson Cowan (1988, 2001), WM is
conceived dynamically as a workspace that consists of temporarily
active representations stored permanently in long-term memory.
In other words, this model identiﬁes WM with a process of main-
taining access to information that is necessary to carry out currenttasks. In Cowan's view, WM is subdivided into two basic elements:
the central executive system and a homogeneous memory system.
The central executive is responsible for directing attention and
voluntary processing. The representations stored in the memory
system vary in their level of activation, as determined by the cur-
rent task. The focus of attention is composed of a subset of the
activated representations and their associations. The focus can be
directed both outward (to the external environment) and inward
(to the existing memory traces). Importantly, Cowan abandoned
the idea of separateness of memory storage systems, suggesting
that the memory store has a domain-general character (Saults &
Cowan, 2007).
Finally, Klaus Oberauer concluded that ‘working memory (…) is
not genuinely a memory. Rather, it is an attentional system that
interacts equally with perception and with (long-term) memory’
(Oberauer, 2009, p. 50). The author believes that WM consists of
highly activated memory representationsda fairly dynamic main-
tenance component used for ongoing cognition. The information is
actively maintained because of the process of allocation of atten-
tion. However, WM is also responsible for retrieval of task-relevant
information through cue-dependent retrieval processes (see also,
Unsworth & Engle, 2007). Furthermore, Oberauer (2009) distin-
guished between declarative WM and procedural WM. Both sys-
tems are conceptualised as largely analogousdas three embedded
components that reﬂect three successive levels of selection of
representations. The declarative WM includes the activated part of
LTM, the region of direct access and the focus of attention. The
procedural part of WM includes the activated procedural repre-
sentations from LTM, the bridge (which holds the currently oper-
ative task set) and the response focus. The procedural WM includes
both primary and executive processes. The primary processes
produce manipulations of declarative representations or overt ac-
tions, while the executive processes can control primary processes.
In summary, although all theories of WM presented above point
to slightly different research directions (Gruszka & Orzechowski,
2016), they emphasize the role of attentional mechanisms in the
functioning of WM. Information overﬂow impairs WM processing
by narrowing the scope of attention and restricting the range of
cues that are encoded and processed. In concordance, limits of
attention have also been recognised in the organisational literature
as limits in ‘span of control’ (Stea, Linder, & Foss, 2015). Gifford
(1992) discussed formal models of allocation of entrepreneurial
attention and optimising techniques or rules that guide behaviour
in this regard. Some of the discussed models recognise only limits
in the ability to take in new information (that can be related to the
attention component of WM), but others also recognise limits in
the ability to recall previously obtained information (that can be
related more to the mnemonic component of WM). Importantly, as
Gifford (1992) pointed out, limited attention has a very important
role in organisation as a whole because it constrains to the span of
control of an individual. We believe that cognitive psychology can
add to the understanding of this problem by helping specify the
WM mechanisms. One factor overlooked in the organisational
literature seems to be the issue of individual differences in WM
abilities.
3. Working memory capacity
Although the termWM refers to a hypothetical cognitive system
responsible for providing access to information required for
ongoing cognitive processes, the term working memory capacity
(WMC) is used to refer to individual differences that pertain to the
personal level ofWMefﬁciency (Wilhelm, Hildebrandt,&Oberauer,
2013). These authors distinguished between three theoretical
views on WMC: the executive attention view (Engle, 2002), the
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the binding hypothesis (Oberauer, 2009).
According to the ﬁrst viewpoint, WMC does not reﬂect indi-
vidual differences inmemory storage but individual variation in the
ability to control attention to maintain information in an active,
easy-to-retrieve state (Engle, 2002). Thus, ‘WM capacity is not
directly about memorydit is about using attention to maintain or
suppress information’ (Engle, 2002, p. 20). Greater WMC results
from greater ability to control attention rather than larger memory
store, and it is linked to the ability to avoid distraction (Redick,
Heitz, & Engle, 2007). Kane and Engle (2000) tested this hypothe-
sis in two experiments. According to the obtained results, lowWMC
participants exhibited greater proactive interference when mem-
orising a subsequent (but not the ﬁrst) list of words than highWMC
participants under the single task condition. However, both groups
showed equivalent proactive interference under the divided
attention condition. Thus, only highWMC individuals suffered from
increased cognitive load, suggesting that they could more ﬂexibly
allocate attention in response to the task demands. It also implies
that individual differences in WMC are related to inhibition
conceived as an active goal-directed process of suppression of
irrelevant material (Redick et al., 2007).
According to the second viewpoint (Unsworth & Engle, 2007),
primary memory is responsible for maintaining relevant repre-
sentations in the activated state bymeans of continued allocation of
attention. Its capacity limit amounts to approximately four items
(Cowan, 2001). Items present in primary memory are retrieved
from secondary memorydi.e. a long-term memory store. Their
retrieval requires a cue-dependent search. Thus, individual differ-
ences in WMC result from variation in maintenance (primary
memory) and retrieval (secondary memory). Thus, low WMC in-
dividuals, as compared to high WMC individuals, perform worse
when active maintenance of information is required. Furthermore,
they are more likely to be distracted and, in result, lose access to the
goal-relevant information. They are also worse at retrieving rele-
vant information because of poor discrimination of relevant and
irrelevant data. Finally, low WMC persons are also more likely to
use context cues that activate more irrelevant information, which
leads to both slower and less accurate recall (Unsworth & Engle,
2007).
Finally, according to the third viewpoint (Oberauer, Süß,
Wilhelm, & Sander, 2008), WM is primarily responsible for build-
ing, maintaining and rapidly updating arbitrary bindings. For
example, items in a to-be-remembered list are bound to form a new
structure (a list), in which objects are bound to locations in space,
whereas concepts are bound to a new mental model. New tem-
porary bindings are generated in the process of construction and
manipulation of novel structures that are utilised for reasoning.
According to the binding hypothesis ofWMC (Oberauer et al., 2008;
Wilhelm, Hildebrandt, & Oberauer, 2013), ‘the limited capacity of
workingmemory arises from interference between bindings, which
effectively limits the complexity of new structural representations,
and thereby constrains reasoning ability’ (Wilhelm et al., 2013, p. 4).
Such interference leads to the partial overwriting of feature-based
representations of the items held in the WM. This process lessens
the overall activation of the item, effectively reducing the proba-
bility and the rate of its recollection. In sum, three different
mechanisms have been proposed as a source of individual variation
in the executive component of WM, namely attentional control
(goal-maintenance), cognitive inhibition and interference
resolution.
WMC is generally considered to be a relatively stable individual
trait, although developmental changes across the life span are ex-
pected. The direct evidence of its stability has been described by the
testeretest reliability (Klein & Fiss, 1999). An indirect indication ofWMC stability can be inferred from its strong relation to general
ﬂuid intelligence (e.g. Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003). Nevertheless,
it is evident thatWMC performance ﬂuctuates in different contexts,
and this intra-individual variation led the researchers to the
conclusion that WMC can be conceptualised not only as a trait but
also as a transient state (Ilkowska & Engle, 2010). Thus, state WMC
refers to the transitory changes from the baseline trait WMC. These
variations can be induced by situational inﬂuences: physiological
factors such as sleep deprivation (Alhola & Polo-Kantola, 2007) or
cognitive fatigue (Anguera et al., 2012). For instance, even minor
aggression from a customer can strongly affect the immediate
cognitive performance of customer service employees by disrupt-
ingWM (Rafaeli et al., 2012). Such a transient shift in WMC efﬁcacy
can be transferred to another task for which WMC is an underlying
factor. For example, Anguera et al (2012) showed that the temporal
depletion of spatial WM resources by means of cognitive exhaus-
tion negatively affected the rate of early motor skill learning. What
is even more surprising, the mere perception of resource depletion
(i.e. illusory fatigue induced by a task-related feedback, as opposed
to the actual depletion) seems to be sufﬁcient to produce deﬁcits in
state WMC (Clarkson, Hirt, Austin Chapman, & Jia, 2011).
Interestingly, improvements in the temporarily available re-
sources (i.e. state-WMC) that can be obtained by means of psy-
chological intervention have been also reported. For example, Autin
and Croizet (2012) developed a brief intervention that was meant
to alleviate concerns about the incompetence faced by school
children in the context of demanding tasks. The study has revealed
that a 10-min intervention designed to reframe metacognitive
interpretation of task difﬁculty (as attributable to learning rather
than of someone's own incompetence), received prior to the difﬁ-
cult anagram task, increased the children's WM complex span and
improved reading comprehension. The intervention also reduced
the accessibility of self-related thoughts of incompetence as
measured by the accessibility of self-knowledge related to
competence or incompetence.
The studies described above indicate thatWMC is malleable and
may be very sensitive to situational and contextual inﬂuences. If so,
the question arises, how can it predict one's general level of per-
formance? This issue can be resolvedwhenwe refer to the notion of
maximal and typical performance introduced by Ackerman
(Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997) in the context of IQ testing. Ac-
cording to this author, in a maximum performance situation
(assuming high levels of motivation), differences in functioning are
attributable primarily to the differences in cognitive abilities. Thus,
intelligence is more highly related with maximum performance
than with typical performance. In contrast, personality is more
predictive of typical performance because it is measured by means
of questionnaires, which are constructed as aggregative measures
of behaviour. As WMC is strongly related to general ﬂuid intelli-
gence, it can be expected to predict the maximal performance in
any natural settings (e.g. job performance).
4. Predictive power of WMC: general cognition
WM may be seen as a mental ‘engine’, and as such, it must be
implicated in many complex cognitive activities that require
controlled effortful processing (Conway & Engle, 1996). Broadway,
Redick, and Engle (2010) reviewed how individual differences in
WMC affect abilities to selectively attend and remember informa-
tion and use it effectively to achieve simple goals deﬁned in
experimental settings. They also depicted the role of WMC outside
the experimental environment, such as in retrieving autobio-
graphical memories, suppressing unwanted thoughts and resisting
mind wandering, which suggests a strong role of WMC in self-
control. Furthermore, Redick et al. (2007) reviewed the cognitive
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inhibitory control. According to these authors, separate inhibitory
functions affect different stages of information processing, namely
access to the information that occurs at the early perceptual stage,
deletion that takes place at the intermediate stage (when infor-
mation enters focus of attention) and restraint that occurs at the
ﬁnal stage of information processing. The authors offered the ap-
plications of executive-attention theory of WMC to social phe-
nomena related to the ability to supress irrelevant thoughts, such as
posttraumatic stress disorder, depression, life stress and stereotype
threat.
4.1. Intelligence and reasoning
One of the strongest and most consistent ﬁndings in the liter-
ature is thatWMC capacity is highly related to reasoning ability and
general ﬂuid intelligence (Chuderski, 2015; Conway et al., 2003;
Chuderski & Ne˛cka, 2012; Engle, Tuholski, Laughlin, & Conway,
1999; Kyllonen & Christal, 1990). For example, in one of the ﬁrst
studies using latent variable approach, Kyllonen and Christal (1990)
demonstrated very strong correlations (near unity) between WMC
and reasoning ability. More precisely, Engle et al. (1999) showed
that the latent variable derived from theWM complex span tasks is
a signiﬁcant predictor of general ﬂuid ability, while the latent var-
iable derived from the simple span tasks was not. Individual vari-
ation in both WMC and reasoning can be explained by the capacity
of the focus of attention and the effectiveness of executive control
over WM (Chuderski & Ne˛cka, 2012).
It is interesting to note, however, that more recent studies have
uncovered more ﬁne-grained details of the links between WMC
and intelligence. For example, Chuderski (2015) suggested a
moderating role of time pressure during ﬂuid intelligence testing
on the relationship between ﬂuid reasoning and WMC. It implies
that the ‘fast’ measurement of intelligence may primarily tap the
WMC, whereas ‘slow (er)’ intelligence testing (i.e. with no time
limit) may also depend on some other cognitive processes beyond
WM. It all suggests that WMC and general intelligence are highly
related but not identical (Conway et al., 2003).
4.2. Multitasking
Another phenomenon that is linked toWMC is multitasking, i.e.
situation when an individual is performing multiple concurrent
tasks, which is prevalent in our everyday life and job-related cir-
cumstances. For example, in one study, nurses had on average 10 or
more activities waiting to be performed at any given time and
experienced 3.4 interruptions per hour (Potter et al., 2005; Wolf
et al., 2006), while unfulﬁlled goals can interfere with later tasks
(Masicampo & Baumeister, 2011). In laboratory settings, multi-
tasking is most often investigated by means of dual task perfor-
mance. The typical result in such a situation would be a
performance decrement observed under a dual task condition, as
compared to a single task condition, because absorbing a sub-
stantial amount of limited capacity processing system by a con-
current activity must have deleterious effects on the performance,
even when they do not have ‘an obvious’ storage component
(Repovs & Baddeley, 2006). Multitasking is related to both intelli-
gence and WMC, but only WMC (its processing and storage com-
ponents) predicts multitasking when the simultaneous
relationship of IQ, WMC and multitasking is considered (Colom,
Martínez-Molina, Shih, & Santacreu, 2010).
Interesting insights concerning multitasking also come from
more applied settings, although research on predicting multi-
tasking performance as an aspect of job performance is rare. For
example (and hardly surprising), speaking on the mobile impairssimulated driving performance (Strayer & Drews, 2007). This
decrement is accompanied by concomitant reductions in brain
driving-related activity by approximately 37% (Just, Keller, &
Cynkar, 2008). Interestingly, Watson and Strayer (2010) showed
that approximately 2.5% (frequency signiﬁcantly greater than
chance) of their sample revealed absolutely no performance
decrement with regard to the dual tasks condition. The researchers
called the participants ‘supertaskers’ because in the single task
condition, they scored in the top quartile on all driving indices and
on complex WMC tasks. It suggests that WMC is one of the best
predictors of multitasking performance.
4.3. Verbal comprehension
Evolutionary psychologists see language and object behaviour
as derivatives of WM. Reading and listening to speech involve not
only comprehension of a stream of separate words but also
computation of the semantic and syntactic relations among them. It
suggests the crucial role of WMC in language comprehension (Just
& Carpenter, 1980). The results of a meta-analysis of over 70 studies
on the association between WMC and language comprehension
reported by Daneman and Merikle (1996) support this view: WMC
is a good predictor of verbal comprehension. The measures that tap
the combined processing and storage capacity of WM (e.g. reading
span, listening span) have been shown as better predictors of
comprehension than the measures that tap only the storage ca-
pacity (e.g. word span, digit span).
Individual differences inWMC can account for several aspects of
language comprehension, such as syntactic modularity, when high
WMC allows interaction among syntactic and pragmatic informa-
tion, or syntactic ambiguity, when high WMC allows maintaining
multiple interpretations (Just & Carpenter, 1992). WMC also sup-
ports sentence parsing, and certain difﬁculties in this regard
observed in the clinical populations may be potentially related to
WMC impairment (Moser, Fridriksson, & Healy, 2007). It should be
noted, however, that not all studies support the strong role of WMC
in language comprehension (Van Dyke, Johns, & Kukona, 2014).
4.4. Verbal ﬂuency
Verbal ﬂuency refers to the lexical access ability, which supports
retrieval of the grammatical representations and sound forms of
words from the mental lexicon. It is operationalised in terms of
verbal ﬂuency performance. Typically, participants are required to
generate as many exemplars from a given category as possible
(category ﬂuency) (Benton,1968), or asmany uniquewords starting
with a given letter (letter ﬂuency) as possible, within 1 min. The
ﬂuency tasks are also often used as valid tools to assess executive
control in both cognitive and neuropsychological investigations.
Several studies have revealed relations between measures of WMC
and verbal ﬂuency. For example, Rosen and Engle (1997) investi-
gated the effects of individual differences inWMC on verbal ﬂuency
under various secondary load conditions (i.e. different types of
secondary tasks). In their study, high WMC participants consis-
tently recalled more exemplars than low WMC individuals. How-
ever, the former were more affected by load conditions, as revealed
by a decline in their recall performance (not present in low WMC
participants). Unsworth, Spillers, and Brewer (2011) used structural
equation modelling to determine the relationship between verbal
ﬂuency and other cognitive constructs such as WMC, vocabulary,
processing speed and inhibition that have been implicated in
ﬂuency performance by prior works. The analysis revealed that
ﬂuency was related to all cognitive abilities under investigation.
However, it was more strongly related to WMC than the other
constructs under consideration. This result conﬁrms an important
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In summary, WMC affects our reasoning ability, multitasking
ability, verbal comprehension and verbal ﬂuency. All these mental
faculties are crucial for dealing with complex professional tasks, in
which the information overﬂow is very likely to occur. What is
more, WMC becomes even smaller under stress and time pressure.
Thus, stress caused by information overﬂow diminishes our mental
faculties that depend on WMC, which consequently decreases our
capacity to cope with the effects of information overﬂow. This kind
of feedback loop must have important consequences for our social
life.
5. Predictive power of WMC: social cognition
Although the literature described above demonstrates the
importance of WMC in so-called ‘cold cognition’, its role in ‘hot
cognition’ cannot be overseen. The area of social cognition and
emotional control also depends on WMC, which will be illustrated
in reference to three phenomena: mentalising, stereotyping and
self-regulation.
5.1. Mentalising
Mentalising, also known as the theory of mind (ToM), is an
ability to ‘read’ other people's minds to understand someone else's
perspective. Processing social cognitive information, such as other
peoples' mental states or traits, is crucial for survival in social
world. This world is very complicated, and our proﬁciency in
navigating in there must be somehow related to our cognitive ca-
pacities. According to the ‘social brain hypothesis’dalso referred to
asMachiavellian intelligencedthe information-processing capacity
of the primate brain (implemented primarily in the neocortex)
explains inter-species differences in social group size among the
primates (Dunbar, 1998). On this basis, Stiller and Dunbar (2007)
hypothesised that individual differences in core cognitive abili-
ties, including WMC and mentalising, are likely to determine the
group size within an individual's social network (obviously, sub-
jected also to social, demographic and other circumstantial factors).
Their study revealed that perspective-taking competence corre-
lates with the number of core contacts of an individualda size of a
so-called clique (i.e. people who would support an individual in
case of a personal problem). In contrast, a size of a so-called sym-
pathy group (a larger group of 12e20 the most frequent social
partners) is determined mainly by the capacity to retain informa-
tion within a short period of time. Interestingly, memory perfor-
mance itself explained approximately 35% of the variance in
performance on the mindreading tasks. It corresponds with an
observation that people usually fail when questions contain more
than ﬁve levels of perspective taking (Kinderman, Dunbar, &
Bentall, 1998), which can be interpreted as requirements
exceeding WMC.
Mentalising is considered to play a vital role in social in-
teractions, and its deﬁcits account for inadequate behaviour. Deﬁ-
cits in ToM have been identiﬁed in autism, Asperger's syndrome
and schizophrenic disorders. In a way, mentalising can be seen as a
complex problem solving, and as such, it is closely related to WMC.
Ample empirical evidence supports this claim. For example, Mutter,
Alcorn, andWelsh (2006) showed that in the age 3e5, performance
on the false belief task can be predicted by inhibitory control and
WMC, with WMC being a somewhat stronger predictor than inhi-
bition. Studies in adult populations suggest that interpretation of
the behaviour of other people is particularly difﬁcult for low WMC
individuals and under high cognitive load demands (Lin, Keysar, &
Epley, 2010). These ﬁndings suggest that morality is easy but lying
is difﬁcult because the latter requires taking a perspective of theother person. In other words, lying needs not only ‘reading’ the
content of another person's mind but also ‘writing’ false beliefs
within it. Indeed, it has been shown that low WMC will facilitate a
tendency to be honest, while having more cognitive capacity would
have enabled one to serve self-interest by lying (Van 't Veer, Stel, &
van Beest, 2014). Interestingly, as Stea et al. (2015) suggested, in-
dividual differences in mentalising provide a natural complement
to the attention-based view of the ﬁrm (outlined above). Although,
in their opinion, the ToM allows for an understanding of the
advantage that organisations have over markets within the
attention-based view, this issue is underdeveloped.
5.2. Stereotyping
WMC determines the ability to incorporate new or inconsistent
information into a pre-existing representation of an object. It
potentially inﬂuences many social phenomena such as peoples'
abilities to organise impressions, judgements or memories of
others. Stereotype-based impression formation has been shown as
less resource-consuming than individuation (Sherman, Macrae, &
Bodenhausen, 2000). In agreement, Conway and Kane (2001) sug-
gested that low WMC individuals form impressions at early stages
of information-processing, resulting in more stereotypic group-
based information in their representations of other people. While
forming impressions, low WMC individuals may be more con-
cerned with information about the target group rather than the
information about a target person (Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004).
These hypotheses have been conﬁrmed by Knuycky (2013). In her
study, participants with low WMC committed a higher number of
stereotype-consistent errors when performing a maintenance task
and accurately recalled fewer stereotype-consistent words when
performing a retrieval task. This result has been interpreted as
showing that lowWMC individuals are lacking resources necessary
to supress automatic associations underlying stereotyped social
perception.
5.3. Self-regulation
Self-regulation may have arisen through evolution, and its
relationship to WM as a central system that supports goal-directed
behaviour is clear (Broadway et al., 2010; Ilkowska & Engle, 2010).
Barkley (2001) considered executive functions (consisting of visual
and verbal WM, among other facets) to be ‘composed of the major
classes of behaviour toward oneself used in self-regulation’
(Barkley, 2001, p. 5). Their adaptive value residues in their role in
maximising the long-term social outcomes for an individual.
Ilkowska and Engle (2010) have offered a conceptual framework
for linking WMC and self-regulation, i.e. ‘the process by which one
monitors, directs attention, maintains, and modiﬁes behaviours to
approach a desirable goal’ (Ilkowska & Engle, 2010, p. 266). Ac-
cording to the authors, both self-regulation and WM deﬁned as
executive control involve overriding a prepotent response, and
depletion of these resources may cause self-regulatory failures. For
example, either alcohol or anxiety (stress) acts as an additional
cognitive load, impairing goal-directed behaviour (alcohol intoxi-
cation narrows a range of perceived cues, and thus, functionally,
narrows attentional focus). Indeed, low WMC has been shown as a
potential mechanism underlying a failure to inhibit unwanted in-
trusions (Brewin & Beaton, 2002) or increased tendency for mind
wandering (McVay & Kane, 2009). In a similar vein, Broadway et al.
(2010) saw the relevance ofWMC to self-regulation and self-control
as a primary mechanism, which determines the content of the
mind by controlling selective attendance and retention of goal-
relevant information. They linked WMC and efﬁcacy of self-
control through processes of retrieving relevant autobiographical
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dering and avoiding impulsive decision-making.
In summary, individual differences in WMC are related not only
to the cognitive outcomes but also to our functioning in the social
world. LowWMC, as compared to highWMC, is related to a reduced
understanding of other peoples' thoughts and feelings, which
presumably comes with a lack of empathy and reduced emotional
intelligence. Our cognitive capacities, including mentalising and
WMC, may even inﬂuence the size of our social network. LowWMC
is also related to stereotyping and dogmatic attitudes as ways of
dealing with too complex information.6. Remediation
The ﬁnal question that we would like to focus on is how we can
overcome WMC limitations. Because of the links between WMC
and awide variety of real-world skills outlined above, the answer to
this question may have many potential applications to the way
people deal with overﬂow, both in the place of work and in
everyday life.6.1. WM training
Although WMC is most commonly viewed as a constant trait,
many recent studies suggest that it can be improved by extended
adaptive training. Klingberg (2010) reviewed the studies
concluding that WM trainings provide an efﬁcient method of
improving WM performance. He found that improvements in
trained WM tasks were approximately 30e40%, whereas those in
non-trained WM tasks (used to assess the effect of transfer) were
approximately 15%. Effect sizes relative to the control group were
approximately 1.0 (Cohen's d). Moreover, Constantinidis and
Klingberg (2016) reviewed neuroimaging data on WM training. It
revealed that training increases the activity of prefrontal cortex
(WM loci) and strengthens connectivity both inside this area and
between the prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex.
It is important to note, however, that some authors do not
support this optimistic view (Owen et al., 2010). One of the speciﬁc
concerns refers to the issue of transfer of training effects to a wider
variety of tasks (i.e. intelligence), to avoid the possibility that any
cognitive improvement observed can be explained by task-speciﬁc
learning (Shipstead, Redick, & Engle, 2012). In a recent meta-
analysis of 20 n-back training studies with ﬂuid intelligence as
outcome measures, Au et al. (2015) showed small but signiﬁcant
positive effects. They concluded that short-term cognitive training
may result in beneﬁcial effects in relation to general intelligence.
However, it is still unclear what kind of factors moderate these
effects, how durable these effects are and how they translate into
practical, real-world settings.
WMC performance can be improved by acquiring relevant
strategies such as rehearsal of the material (Baddeley, 1983) or
chunking (Bor, Duncan, Wiseman, & Owen, 2003; Cowan, 2001;
Ericcson, Chase, & Faloon, 1980; Miller, 1956). These methods are
based on conscious strategies for handling the material and are
meant to overcome storage capacity limitations and allow the
reduction of task complexity. Finally, WMC improvements can be
also obtained by means of psychological intervention, such as
expressive writing (Klein & Boals, 2001), or brief interventions
meant to reframe metacognitive interpretation of a task difﬁculty
as attributable to the learning process rather than someone's own
incompetence (Autin & Croizet, 2012). In both these studies, WMC
improvements were mediated by the reduction of self-related
intrusive thoughts.6.2. Task simpliﬁcation
Tasks we deal with may be categorised according to two di-
mensions: difﬁculty and complexity (Liu & Li, 2012). The ﬁrst
dimension, difﬁculty, deﬁnes the probability of ﬁnding a tenable
solution in a reasonable time horizon, whereas the second
dimension, complexity, refers to the number of elements a problem
at hand consists of. For overﬂowed and structurally limited minds,
the tasks' complexity matters more than its difﬁculty, although
both dimensions may operate in conﬂuence. It is important to
realise that, psychologically, the task's complexity is not objectively
deﬁned. Rather, it amounts to the number of elements we have to
activate in ourminds to be able to grasp the essence of the problem.
In other words, task's complexity amounts to the complication of its
cognitive representation. If so, we may try to cope with complexity
by getting rid of those elements of task'smental representation that
are superﬂuous or redundant. Typical professional problems are
usually too difﬁcult because of tremendous redundancy: important
issues are intertwined with less important or even useless, with no
clear indication which is which. Therefore, an important part of
every professional's work consists in the selection of relevant issues
to ignore irrelevant ones. Experienced experts know what is rele-
vant and what is not a bit earlier than less experienced ones
(Shanteau, 1992; Sheridan & Reingold, 2014).
Nevertheless, the ability to discern important elements of the
task's structure is very rare even among experts. It may be
strengthened in the process that Herbert Simon (1977) called
‘familiarization’: Recurrent attempts to solve a complicated task
make it increasingly more familiar, in the sense of being better and
better understood. During familiarization, a formerly chaotic, ill-
structured situation gets increasingly more ‘elegant’, well-
structured and organised. Suddenly, it becomes simpliﬁed enough
to be manageable by WM, despite its well-known limitation. Ac-
cording to Simon, this strategy of task simpliﬁcation supports sci-
entiﬁc insight leading to discovery. Outside academia, this strategy
of dealing with overﬂowmay be efﬁcient as well, although it needs
large amount of time and effort. Another possible strategy pro-
posed in the context of organisational research may rely on opti-
mising organisational design. Kennedy (1994) examined the
optimal structure of an organisation in which analysts process in-
formation on the behalf of decision-makers to overcome their
natural limitations in attentional scope.
6.3. Situated and distributed cognition
Human minds are easily overﬂownwhile operating in isolation.
However, cognition is always situated, which means that mental
processes including thinking, problem solving and decision-
making take place in a particular situation or context (Brown,
Collins, Duguid, 1989). Therefore, the elements of the external
context can be included into cognitive processes as its supportive
elements. When overﬂown, people often use post-it notes and
similar cues for memory retrieval. The so-called method of loci is a
mnemonic technique that consists in imaginary location of mem-
orised items in different places in a physical space, such as one's
own apartment, a park or a shopping centre. Imaginary walking
around this space facilitates memory retrieval, especially when the
material has a linear structure (e.g. a talk or lecture). What is
beneﬁcial for memory retrieval may also support other cognitive
processes, including problem solving and decision-making.
Cognition does not need to occur as a set of symbolic processes
hidden in one's individual brain. Rather, it may cross the borders
deﬁned by the skull to incorporate available external cues.
Human cognition is also distributed, which means that complex
mental processes occur in the social network (Gureckis &
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from those of the individuals who comprise them (Hutchins, 1991).
Working in teams may substantially increase productivity, pro-
vided that team members are trained for that and obey the rules of
cooperation. The effect of synergy, as it seems, occurs if every team
member can offer an added value to the collective work.
Contrariwise, it does not occur if team members cannot overcome
their individual limitations and drawbacks by beneﬁtting from
someone else's competencies. As to WM limitations, they are quite
robust and universal, but people substantially differ in their WMC.
In addition, this individual trait tends to ﬂuctuate because of
emotional distress, intrusive thoughts or just fatigue. Hence, there
is a possibility that team members who experience relatively small
limitations of WMC, be it for good or at the moment, take over the
most overloading part of the team's activity. Moreover, team
members can deliberately divide a complex task into smaller ele-
ments, whichwill be less demanding forWMC. Finally, even though
all team members are equally deprived of substantial part of their
WMC, for instance at the end of the exhausting day, it is fairly
possible that every individual member retains in his/her WM an
important chunk of information that is lacking in other persons'
mind. The point is that the sum of limited and overloaded minds
may nevertheless generate a collective mind of reasonable quality.
Distributed cognition also refers to the use of electronic devices,
such as computers, phones, and tablets (Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh,
2000). It is still not clear if such devices are beneﬁcial for our
memory. On the one hand, they store information, help to keep
deadlines and take off our heads many dull chores. On the other
hand, their long-term inﬂuence may be harmful because electronic
devices make us less likely to master and train our WM skills. For
instance, in everyday life, people are decreasingly less dependent
on mental arithmetic, i.e. counting in memory, although in the past
it was ubiquitous (e.g. while shopping). It is well established that
mental arithmetic is a task heavily dependent on WMC (DeStefano
& LeFevre, 2004), so the less we count in memory, the morewe lose
opportunities to enhance our minds through everyday practice.
However, this issue is not investigated enough to allow conclusive
statements.
6.4. Beneﬁts of dual coding
Complex problems may become less complex after change of
their mental representation. In particular, the switch from verbal
code to the imaginary form of representation usually makes a dif-
ference. According to Alan Paivio (1971), there are two co-operating
systems of the human mind: verbal and non-verbal. Although they
co-operate, one of them usually dominates over the other one in a
particular problem situation. The dominant system can transfer
data to the subservient one, but it takes time and effort, not to
speak about inevitable loss of information. However, such transfers
may result in greater cognitive ﬂexibility. They may also reduce the
task's complexity to the extent that makes it manageable byWM of
very limited capacity. Let us suppose that we have to describe in
words how the standard chessboard looks like. It is a doable albeit
time-consuming and error-prone job, and nevertheless, it is likely
that the recipients of our message will be puzzled. Now, let us
suppose that we have to describe not only how the chessboard
looks like but also what is the situation in the particular chess
game. It is much easier and quicker to draw the situation on the
checkerboard. In general, the use of visual channel results in
simpliﬁcation of the problem at hand so as to make it manageable
for WM.
Typically, we beneﬁt from imagination, but sometimes switch-
ing to the verbal code makes the problem easier. In such instances,
an elegant verbal phrase, or a notion of exceptional semanticdensity, reduces the overwhelming complexity of the task situa-
tion. Charles Darwin reduced our mental representation of the
process of evolution through the introduction of the notion of
‘natural selection’. We are aware what artiﬁcial selection is as it has
been practiced for thousands of years in breeding plants and ani-
mals. Darwin persuaded us that something similar is happening in
nature, without any deliberate planning, because it is the envi-
ronment that plays the role of a ‘breeder’. Scientiﬁc notions have
great explanatory power when used properly; they are also apt to
transform an overwhelmingly complex problem into a simpler one
without loss of information. The use of metaphor may have similar
results because metaphorical language is both synthetic and ﬁgu-
rative. It has been showed that the use of metaphor in thinking and
problem solving is an effective intellectual tool, particularly in
creativity and divergent thinking. From our perspective, it is
important to underscore that ‘metaphors we live by’ (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1980) make our minds better prepared to deal with task
complexity, despite the natural limitations of our WM system.
Unfortunately, imaginationwas described as a missing factor in the
literature dealing with leadership and organisation (Witt, 1998).
7. Conclusions
The review of the concept of WM and research on its functional
signiﬁcance presented here provides some explanation as to why
people suffer from information overload. Current theories agree
that WM constitutes an ‘engine’ of human mind. It is a complex,
processing and storage system, and its fundamental property is the
basic capacity limit. Importantly, WMC limits seem to be arising
mainly from the functional constraints on the attentional mecha-
nisms in WM (Oberauer, 2009), an issue that has also been recog-
nised by organisational researchers (see Gifford, 1992 for review).
People differ in their WM abilities, and these differences are pre-
dictive not only for the ‘cold’ cognition but also for the ‘hot’ social or
emotional functions. Therefore, WMC is predictive of many cogni-
tive and social outcomes. Fortunately, these limitations may be
overcome (to some extent) through instruments such as training of
WM skills, task simpliﬁcation strategies, situated and distributed
cognition, and adjusting appropriate cognitive strategies.
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